IDontCode

Compilers, Windows, Obfuscation, x86-64, Hardware Hacking, and everything in-between. CEO & Cofounder of Back Engineering Labs

Deobfuscation and Analysis of Ring-1.io

As part of this research, we partially deobfuscated multiple Themida-protected binaries used by ring-1.io, including its UEFI bootloader implant. Several critical functions were recovered to enable static analysis of the implant’s behavior. This work provides visibility into mechanisms that are intentionally designed to resist inspection, including virtualization-assisted hooks, execution redirection, and kernel manipulation techniques.

Theodosius - Jit linker, Symbol Mapper, and Obfuscator

Existing software protection frameworks typically operate at a small range of compilation levels. The highest level of obfuscation typically operates upon source code directly (source2source), the second highest level is LLVM IR (via optimization passes), and the third and final most common is upon the native binary image (bin2bin).

EZVIZ BD-2402B1 Back Engineering and SNES9X Port

EZVIZ BD-2402B1 is a surveillance system DVR which uses hisilicon SoC’s. My goal was to repurpose the hardware to run a custom fork of snes9x. In order to achieve this a serious amount of reverse engineering, and learning was required. Not only was this a hardware based project, but it was also a software heavy project.

VMProtect 2 - Part Two, Complete Static Analysis

The purpose of this article is to expound upon the prior work disclosed in the last article titled, VMProtect 2 - Detailed Analysis of the Virtual Machine Architecture, as well as correct a few mistakes. In addition, this post will focus primarily on the creation of static analysis tools using the knowledge disclosed in the prior post...

VMProtect 2 - Detailed Analysis of the Virtual Machine Architecture

VMProtect 2 is a virtual machine based x86 obfuscator which converts x86 instructions to a RISC, stack machine, instruction set. Each protected binary has a unique set of encrypted virtual machine instructions with unique obfuscation. This project aims to disclose very significant signatures which are in every single VMProtect 2 binary with the intent to aid in further research...

Voyager - A Hyper-V Hacking Framework

Voyager is a Hyper-V hijacking project based upon existing Hyper-V hijacking work by cr4sh which aims to extend the usability to AMD and earlier Windows 10 versions. This project however does not support secure boot or legacy bios yet. I would highly suggest checking out cr4sh’s work on Hyper-V as this project is almost entirely based upon it with some minor differences in inject techniques...

Hyperspace - Hidden Address Spaces

On Windows, each process has its own virtual address space. The CR3 value loaded into a logical processor is located inside of the KPROCESS structure...

Reverse Injector - Merging Address Spaces

The bottom 256 PML4E’s are what map all code, data, and stacks. The 256th PML4E maps modules such as ntdll.dll, and other loaded modules. As you can foresee, some PML4E index’s overlap. In order to handle overlapping PML4E’s, Reverse Injector simply finds empty PML4E’s and inserts the remote PML4E’s into them.

MSREXEC - Elevate Arbitrary WRMSR to Kernel Execution

MSREXEC is a library to elevate arbitrary MSR (Model Specific Register) writes to kernel execution. The project is extremely modular and open ended on how writes to MSR’s are achieved...

PTM - Page Table Manipulation From Usermode

PTM is a Windows 10 C++ library that allows a programmer to manipulate all memory, physical, and virtual from user-mode. The project inherits an interface from VDM allowing the use of a physical memory read-write primitive to fuel this project. VDM is used solely to configure the page tables in such a way that PTM can manage them from user-mode. Once the page tables are configured for PTM VDM is no longer required. However, VDM can inherit an instance of PTM as a means to read and write physical memory. Both VDM and PTM work extremely well together and independently from each other.

VDM - Vulnerable Driver Manipulation

Exploiting vulnerable Windows drivers to leverage kernel execution is not a new concept. Although software that exploits vulnerable drivers has been around for a long time, there has yet to be a highly modular library of code that can be used to exploit multiple drivers exposing the same vulnerability...

PSKP - Process-Context Specific Kernel Patch

Knowing that PML4(E)’s of the kernel are not globally mapped, one could rebuild the paging tables for a given address. This idea of rebuilding is simply allocating a new page, copying all entries into the new page and finally editing the paging table entry specified by the corresponding paging table index in the linear virtual address. An illustration of this process of rebuilding is illustrated below.

Virtual Memory - Intro to Paging Tables

Virtual memory is probably one of the most interesting topics of modern computer science. Although virtual memory was originally designed back when physical memory was not an abundant resource to allow the use of disk space as ram, it has stuck with us, offering security, modularity, and flexibility. Unlike the rest of the content on my sites which is bound to an operating system, virtual memory is really a CPU level concept.

Physmeme - Windows Unsigned Kernel Driver Mapper

Physmeme is a driver mapper that works with any form of read and write to physical memory. It is highly modular code that allows a reverse engineer to easily integrate their own vulnerable driver. If you are able to read and write to physical memory you can now map an unsigned driver into your kernel just by coding four functions...